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PART^Eg
1.

Defendant?

»nd

thirfl~p$trty

pXaintiffg

are

Landforms Construction Corp., Landforms Development Inc.,
Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, Hale/Redd
Investment Group, a general partnership, a/k/a Redd Hale
Investment
venture»
property

Group

and

Hale/Redd

Land

Investment, a joint

These parties are landowners and developers of
known

as

Bridlewood

property in Davis County.

located

near

homeowners'

(The partnership or joint venture

formed by Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd and Lyle A. Hale
has been referred to by different titles; therefore, it is
referred to in different ways in the pleadings .)
2.
Davis County.

Third-party defendants are Bountiful City and
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
iq. i em*
this
•MII

appeal

pursuant

J- VI r r

Ku i es

-

..)!JI'

c. t

to

* he

provisions

<« the C o r ^ i t ut i ^n

utaJi

supreme

? O ) ( j i i 1988) , rimi
Procedur e•

.-.,•.•,

Rule

.. ui ,

-ider and hear
of

Section

of pt^h, Rule
-

-.,• .

* of

- ot the
•* < - i

S4(b) of * h? ^tah Rules

*t «*ivil

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in granting Bountiful

Summary Judgment and concluding that the acts complained of
in the First Amended Complaint and the Amended Third-Party
Complaint involved the management of flood waters or the
construction,

repair

and

operation

of

flood

and

storm

systems.
2.

Is Utah Code Annotated,

Section

63-30-3

(1986)

unconstitutional?
3.

Does construing the Utah Comparative Fault Act

require that Bountiful remain in the case for the purpose of
determining comparative fault?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
VTAH CONSTITUTION, Article Ir Section 22
[private property for public use]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. Section 63-30-3 (1986)
Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the
exercise
of
a governmental
function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from
an approved
medical, nursing,
or
other
professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private
facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and
operation
of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities•

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Uectioii 63-30-8 .HMSii
Waxver of immunity for injury caused i >y ueiectiver
unsafe,
or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
IiMiuiin.^ x UK.JIU .^.^A. oi ci.li jovernmentaj entities is
waived for any injury caused by a. defective,
unsafe^ or dangerous condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure located
thereon.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 63-3i) ~ 1. (1986)
Waiver of immunity for injury from da11yt c r ous oJ
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement—Exception.
;. .;-I'I-..JIJ j «: y irojii suit ol all government a i entitle,- is
wa ,ved for any injury caused from a dangerou:- or
defective condition or any pub Lie improvement.
Immunity
is no4- waived
f-;-r Jatent defer4- .\rc*
conditions,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, beuiion o j - j u •• i , \ ±,-JO U J
Waiver 'if immunity for injury caused by negligent
act or omission of employee—Exceptions—Waiver
for injury caused by violation of fourth amendment
rights.
<; L ,
»
Immunity front suit or ai,fc governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately caused
by .
5 negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scop<? r** employment except if
the ini^rv:(a)
arises out OJL LJJ- ^KBZ cise or
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or
not the discretion is abused; -^r
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988)
W a i v e r of" iuruauiiiL f for
without compensation.

taki ng

pri vate

property

( f i Luununit.y from .^ULL ..d: <*.*...* governmental
entities
is waived
for the recovery of
compensation from the governmental entity when the
governmental entity has taken or damaged private
property without just compensation.

(2) Compensation and damages shall be
assessed according to the requirements of Chapter
34, Title 78.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-27-38 (1987)
Comparative Negligence.
However, no defendant is liable to any other
person seeking recovery for an amount in excess of
the proportion of fault to that defendant.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. SECTION 78-27-40 (1987)
Amount of liability limited
fault—no contribution

to

proportion

of

Subject to Section 78-27-38 the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage of proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant. No
defendant is entitled to contribution from any
other person.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. SECTION 1Q-8-8 (1986)
Streets,, parks, airports f parking
public grounds and pedestrian malls.

facilities v

They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen,
narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,
parks, airports, parking lots or other facilities
for the parking of vehicles off streets, public
grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate th€>
same or parts thereof, by ordinance.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 57-5-3 (1986)
Maps and plats to be
approvedf and recorded.

acknowledgedf

certified,

Such map or plat shall be acknowledged. .. .and
certified by the surveyor making such plat; if the
land is situated in any city or incorporated town
such plat or map shall be approved by its
governing body....
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Landforms

are

the

developers

Bridlewood Subdivision, located in Bountiful, Utah.

of
The

- - ^'. .pj^-

'
? *

The

i- hree p h a s e s .

pr el L H U H O J y

approved December S

19H*

p 1 ans

x ne

of

^LH/U-L V I S P . -

lack Balling D e p o s i t i o n ,

9

>••

•

*

--- -

Exhibit

-'.a*

Developer
to p r o v i d e
on-site
storm
detention
facilities to satisfaction
of B o u n t i f u l
^it-y,
D a v i s C o u n t y and a d j a c e n t p r o p e r t y o w n e r s .

final

approval

• >

* Phase

*-|

t Bridlewood
* >- f

« *.

conditions, -:. n^

* wi* *

Subdivision,
to

d

(Jack

numbejL

of

. -:

Providing for storm detention fox the runoff .in
the Hooper Canyon Drainage Basin, with the release
rate of 2 c.f.s. The release rate and conditions
were agreed upon when the property was annexed by
Bountiful
4c
ultimately

;

e

determined

by

iiridJ

Davis

f

i^provai
i.-,s

County

as

agree

;•/

Landforms. that Landforms participate in the construction of
a

regions.

•>•-..

.--.*-• s- * i• - *

, ••

-

• v-:. i

Boulevard site, (Jack Bailing Deposition, P..5^«
5,

^riri:nj

Llie

^omrie-* i^"

*

that

detention basin, ...ancJtorms was ie,ju ; *-•
flood control measures,

which
tiiack

the Subdivision
(AT

'"^

required

« . ., r .

a

(Jack B a l l i n g D e p o s i t i o n , p

* :'sd f c ; ;i
through

regional

-»nd

<-• i i i r/ea L U construct
. : uidei to p r o v i d e a secono
was

t^a.iix.-j L - e ^ ^ j ' ; n

fnjrsaar.it
u

to
•

City

p

v

^

a

road

dc-.^s

Ordinance.
nn f ':oo— - -.-f

s t r e e t s and the p u r p o s e s ot c u r b s , g u t t e r s , inlet boxes and
-".

. ..

. J Sturm

detention

basins

16

i^

the

collection

and management

of

storm

waters,

(Jack

Balling

Affidavits, R.135, 525).
7.
occasions

Plaintiffs

since

allege

December,

1985

that

and

as

on

a

recent

number

of

as August,

1987, but principally on August 20, 1986, storm water runoff
coming from Landforms Bridlewood Subdivision damaged their
property, thus precipitating this lawsuit.
8.

The plaintiffs

filed

an action

defendants (Landforms) on December 11, 1986.

against

On October 30,

1987 the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint
and

alleged

in

five

causes

of

action

the

that

(R.40)

damages

were

sustained from:
(1)

"....diverting

from the

property"

(2)

"allowing

the

natural

excessive

and

flow

of

runoff

substantial

runoff

water to flood plaintiffs' properties"
(3)
action

"the instances of flooding caused by wrongful

and

admission

of

the

defendants.... interfered

with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of their property"
(4)

"defendants

have been put on notice of the

numerous floodings...."
(5)
complete

"defendants acted maliciously and wantonly in
disregard

for

the

rights

and

safety

of

plaintiffs in causes of action 1 through 4"
9.

Landforms

filed

an

Amended

Third-Party

Complaint, (R.418) wherein they alleged:
(14)

"In the event these defendants are found
-10-

liable

to

plaintiffs....therefore,

in

such

event,

these defendants are entitled to be fully indemnified
and recover judgment over against Bountiful City and
Davis County. . . ."
10.
County

They further alleged Bountiful City and Davis

negligently

delayed

the

construction

of

the

Bridlewood Subdivision by their indecision with respect to
the

regional

detention

basin....this

delay

caused

a

potential flood hazard to exist in that Bridlewood remained
only partially complete without curb, gutter, asphalt roads,
catch basins and a permanent storm detention facility....
they further alleged that Bountiful City and Davis County
negligently and carelessly required third-party plaintiffs
to cut one roadway in Bridlewood from top to bottom.
4.
Judgment,
(R.44 6).

Bountiful

(R.133).

The

filed
Court

a

Motion

granted

for

Summary

Summary

Judgment

The court concluded that:
(4) The immunity granted by the Act extends to
the acts or the failure to do the acts of
planning, designing, constructing, repairing and
operating or managing flood waters.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

judgment

of

the

trial

court

should

be

A.

The action of Bountiful with respect to the

affirmed.

Bridlewood

Subdivision

involved

the management

of

flood

waters or the construction, repair and operation of flood
and storm systems and was thus a governmental function with
absolute immunity.

In plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, they allege that
the defendants

(Third-Party Plaintiffs and others) through

their acts and omissions negligently and carelessly planned,
designed and developed flood control improvements, causing
plaintiffs

damages.

In

Landforms

Amended

Third-Party

Complaint they allege that the flood and storm control work
was

performed

in

accordance

with

Bountiful

City's

requirements and they were prevented from developing a storm
detention basin and that Bountiful delayed construction of
the

subdivision;

delayed

making

a

decision

on

the

construction of a regional detention basin; required a road
from top to bottom

of the project.

All of these acts

complained of relate to the management of flood waters or
the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm
systems.
B.

The second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of

the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (at all times hereafter,
the "Act") granted absolute immunity for the management of
flood waters and the construction, repair and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental entities.
C.
governmental

Even if the actions of the City was not a
function

under

Section

63-30-3 of the Act,

which it was, such actions were governmental functions under
the test in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., infra.

The

actions are of "such a unique nature that it can be only
performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential
to the core of governmental activity".

-12-

D.

Immunity

is

not

waived

for

injury

from

dangerous or defective structures or other improvementsr or
for injury caused by defective condition of highway, bridges
or other structures, because those acts are not elements of
the causes of actions and were not complained of in the
Amended

Complaint

or

the Amended

Third-Party

Complaint.

Additionally, Section 63-30-3 of the Act grants absolute
immunity.
E.
Act

does

The waiver under Section 63-30-10.5 of the

not

apply

as

it

was

enacted

complained of and the damages sustained.

after

the

acts

Additionally, the

"taking" or "damage" of private property does not relate to
unintentional damage or negligence sounding in tort.
F.
Constitution
invalid.
and

Article

I,

Section

does not render Section

22

of

the

Utah

63-30-3 of the Act

The constitutional provision is not self-executing

does not

include unintentional

or negligent

damages

sounding in tort.
G.
inconsistent

Granting
with the

Comparative Fault Act

absolute

immunity

Utah Comparative

is

not

Fault Act.

The

does not require the inclusion of all

parties to the action and the court, even so, can consider
the comparative fault of all parties to an occurrence or
incident even though some of them are not party litigants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

-13-

THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY BOUNTIFUL CITY IN
RELATION TO THE BRIDLEWOOD PROJECT INVOLVED
THE MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR AND OPERATION OF FLOOD
AND STORM SYSTEMS AND WAS A GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION WITH ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
A.

Governmental Function

Landforms

suggests

that

the

actions

taken

by

Bountiful City in relation to the Bridlewood project did not
involve the management of flood waters or the construction,
repair, or operation of flood and storm systems.
To consider this issue we must go to plaintiffs'"
First Amended Complaint (R.40) and Landforms Amended ThirdParty

Complaint.

Complaint
plaintiffs

(R.418)•

In plaintiffs' First Amended

it is alleged that the defendants
and

others)

through

(third-party

their acts and omissions

negligently and carelessly planned, designed and developed
and

constructed

improvements

which

changed

natural

conditions and contour of the property, thus increasing,
aggravating, concentrating and diverting the natural flow of
runoff and causing flood damage.

And from the foregoing the

defendants were negligent, trespassed, caused a nuisance and
intentionally inflicted and caused emotional distress.
Landforms' Amended Third-Party Complaint alleges:
(Paraphrased)
(a) Flood and storm control work performed
by third-party plaintiffs was in accordance with
Bountiful City and Davis County requirements.
This work:
(1) Prevented third-party plaintiffs
from developing their own storm detention
basin.

(2) Delayed
subdivision which
hazards.

construction
of the
caused potential flood

(3) Delayed making a decision on the
construction of a regional storm detention
basin.
(4) Required a road from top to bottom
of the project which acted as a funnel or
channel
for
waters
which
flowed
in
plaintiff's property and caused damage.
In the

affidavit

and

supplemental

affidavit

of

Jack P. Balling, Bountiful City Engineer, he indicated that:
4.
One of the purposes of streets and the
purposes of curbs, gutters, inlet boxes and storm
drain lines and storm detention basins are for the
collection
and management
of storm waters.
(Affidavit).
3.
The flood
and storm water systems
devised by Davis County and Bountiful City
consists of creeks and waterways; a complex of
streets, curbs, gutters, inlet boxes and storm
drain pipes, culverts and water detention basins.
(Supplemental Affidavit).
4.
The streets, curbs, gutters, inlet
boxes, storm drain pipes, culverts and water
detention basins within the Bridlewood Subdivision
and the plans and construction of the particular
regional detention basin mentioned in the thirdparty plaintiffs' complaint is a part of this
system and is within the Hooper Canyon drainage
district system. (Supplemental Affidavit).
The

lower

court

granted

Bountiful's

motion

for

summary judgment and concluded as a finding of fact:
The immunity granted by the Act extends to the
acts or the failure to do the acts of planning,
designing, constructing, repairing and operating
or managing flood waters.
It is quite evident that the acts complained of in
plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint and the
Amended Third-Party Complaint were in the
management of flood waters or in the construction,
repair and operation of flood and storm systems

and involved acts or the failure to act to do the
acts
of planning,
designing,
constructing,
repairing and operating or managing flood waters.
B.

Absolute Immunity

Section
absolute

63-30-3

of

the Act,

immunity to governmental

as

amended,

grants

entities engaged

in the

management of flood waters and the construction, repair and
operation of flood and storm systems.
During

its

1984

budget

session

the

Utah

Legislature passed a "Flood Relief" Bill, Senate Bill 97,
that contained an amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Act.
The Section with the amended portion reads as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [act]
Chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the
exercise
of
a
governmental
function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from
any
approved
medical,
nursing
or
other
professional
health
care
clinical
training
program conducted in either public or private
facilities.
The
m^pag$m$nt
<?f flppfl water?
and
the
construction, repair, and the operation of flood
and StQrm sy?tem? £y gQvernmentftl entities ar_e
considered to be governmental functions, and,
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from these activities.
(Emphasis added)
It

should

be

noted

that

63-30-3

of the Act

is

divided into two independent provisions.

Prior to 1984 the

first

an

suit

paragraph
qualified

existed

alone,

by the phrase

granting

immunity

from

"except as may be otherwise

provided in this Chapter".
Following

the

statewide

-16-

floods

of

1983,

the

Legislature

amended

paragraph•

That

Section

new

3

by

provision

adding

gives

an

the

second

absolute

and

unqualified immunity from suit to governmental entities for
flood and storm-related activities.
The

qualifying

language

found

in

the

first

paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of the Act does not apply to
the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm
systems.

If the Legislature had intended for the qualifying

phrase to carry over to the new provision, it would have
completed the amendment at that point where it defined these
activities

as

a

"governmental

function"

and

would

have

simply added it to the first paragraph rather than creating
an entirely new paragraph.

By enacting a second paragraph

with the clear language that governmental entities and their
officers and employees "are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from" flood related activities, however,
the Legislature intended and accomplished the statement that
such activities are given absolute immunity.
Decisions rendered by the First, Second, Third,
Fourth Judicial Districts, with
identical

factual

similarities and

legal issues, as the incident case, have held

that governmental

entities are immune from suit for the

management of flood waters and the construction, repair and
operation

of

flood

and

storm

systems.

Although

these

decisions are not binding on this court, they do provide
persuasive authority and this court should adhere to these
consistent, well-reasoned decisions.

POINT II
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY BOUNTIFUL CITY IN
THE MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR AND OPERATION OF
FLOOD AND STORM SYSTEMS, WAS A
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
A.

A Governmental Function

Landforms

argues

that

the

actions

Bountiful City are not governmental functions.
Bountiful

argued

involved

the

construction,
systems.

that

the

management
repair

It

then

and

actions
of

flood

operation

follows

taken

that

by

waters

of
such

flood

taken

by

In Point I
Bountiful
and
and

activities

the
storm
are

governmental functions by virtue of paragraph 2 of Section
63-30-3 of the Act which provides:
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair and
operation
of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be
governmental functions and governmental entities
and their officers and employees are immune from
suit for any injury or damage resulting from these
activities. (Emphasis added)
We submit that this statute is controlling and dispositive.
We hesitate to argue any alternative position, but will do
so.

Even if the foregoing Section is not controlling, which

we firmly

submit that it is, under all other tests the

actions of Bountiful City were

"governmental functions".

The actions were governmental functions under the test in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah,
1980) at page 1236:
The [Test] for determining governmental immunity
is whether the activity under consideration is of
such a unique nature that it can only be performed

by a governmental agency or that it is essential
to the core of governmental activity.
In

this

situation

only

a

government

can make

decisions on a city-wide flood control system or establish a
city-wide
actions

street
are

system or approve a subdivision.

clearly

a

governmental

Such

function

under

Standiford, supra.
B.

Immunity Not Waived.

No statutory waivers apply to this situation as
immunity

is

absolute.

Landforms

argue

a

waiver

under

Section 63-30-8 of the Act, a waiver of immunity for injury
caused

by

defective,

unsafe

or

dangerous

highways, bridges or other structures.
either

condition

of

It is not alleged

in plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint or in the

Amended Third-Party Complaint that there was a defective,
unsafe or dangerous condition of a highway, bridge or other
structures.
Landforms argues a waiver under Section 63-30-9,
which provides for a waiver of immunity for injury from
dangerous or defective public buildings, structures or other
public improvements.

In plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint

and in Landforms Amended Third-Party Complaint they do not
allege a dangerous, defective structure, dam, reservoir or
other public improvement and they cannot raise it on appeal.
Again, it is not shown that a dam, reservoir or
other

public

improvement

was defectively made.

broke or collapsed due to being defectively made.

Nothing

Landforms next argue a waiver under Section 63-3010 of the Act, which provides for a waiver of immunity for
injury

caused

by

the

negligent

act

or

omission

of

an

employee, but provides there is no waiver if the negligence:
(a) Arises from the exercise or performance of or
the
failure
to
exercise
or
perform
a
discretionary function.
In this case the decisions of whether to have a
regional detention basin or not and whether to have a road
put

in fully or in phases, are discretionary•

Gleave v.

Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 749 P.2d 660
(Utah, app, 1988) sets forth an approach to this issue:
More recently in Little v. Utah State Division of
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983), the
Court
adopted
the
following
test
for
distinguishing between functions at the policymaking level from those at the operational level,
requiring affirmative answers to four preliminary
questions in order for an act to be purely
discretionary:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
decision
necessarily
involve
a
basic
governmental policy, program or objective?
(2) Is the question,
act, omission or
decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program or
objective, as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction
of the
policy, program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission or decision
require
the
exercise
of basic
policy
evaluation, judgment and expertise on the
part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess
the
requisite
constitutional
statutory or lawful authority and duty to do
or make the challenged act, omission or
decision?

In this particular case the actions of Bountiful
complained of by Landforms were purely discretionary for the
following reasons:
(1)

The

challenged

regional

detention

policies,

programs

basin)
or

acts

(full-length

involve

objectives .

basic
A

street plan is a policy of the City.

road

and

governmental

coherent,

workable

Also, a flood control

system utilizing streets and regional detention basins is a
governmental program and objective.
(2)

Landforms urge that the local detention basin

system was better but this would change the course and
direction

of

objectives.

the

government's

policies,

programs

and

The same is true for streets.

(3)

The

decisions

concerning

streets

and

a

regional detention basin system, are an exercise of a basic
policy evaluation and judgment based on the expertise on the
part of the government.
(4)

The actions of Bountiful are fully authorized

by lawful authority.
given

in

Section

The authority to lay out streets is
10-8-8,

UCA,

1953,

subdivisions in Section 57-5-3, UCA, 1953.

and

to

approve

The city's

plan

of a regional detention system is pursuant to a county-wide
flood control system, authorized by Davis County Ordinance
No. 01-87.
Meeting
complained

of

all

were

four

purely

requirements
discretionary

immunity is not waived under 63-30-10.

the
and

actions
therefore

Plaintiff also contends that the 1987 enactment of
Section 63-30-10.5 of the Act now authorizes the maintenance
of the suit for the "taking" or "damage" of private property
for public use without just compensation.
that

such a suit may be brought

enacted appropriate

The City concurs

if the Legislature has

enabling legislation.

They have not

done so.
In the instant case, Section 63-30-10.5 is of no
avail to third-party plaintiffs for two reasons:

(1) The

statute gives rise to a new cause of action which did not
exist prior to April,

1987, (the effective date) and, (2)

The statute does not contemplate suit sounding in tort or
negligence.

In paragraph 26 of plaintiff's

Complaint,

they

alleged

that

instances

First Amended
of

flooding

"occurred on numerous occasions since December, 1985, and as
recent

as

August,

1987....".

In third-party

defendant

Bountiful's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs, the
question was asked of the plaintiffs to indicate the dates
of all floods which plaintiffs allege caused them damages.
The answer to that interrogatory no. 1 was the first week in
December, 1985, on or about March 9, 1986, on or about July
23, 1986, on or about August 20, 1986, and September, 1986.
Section
principles
enacted

by

63-30-10.5

relating
the

to

is

not

retroactive

Legislature

are

retroactive.
application
settled

in

The

of

laws

Okland

Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 108
(Utah, 1974) .

A later statute or amendment should not be

applied in a retroactive manner to deprive a party of his
rights

or

impose

a

greater

principle has no application

liability

upon

him.

That

when the latter statute or

amendment deals only with the clarification or

application

as to how the laws should have been understood prior to its
enactment.

This court stated in Carlucci v. Utah State

Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah, 1986)
The law establishing substantive rights and
liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not
a subsequently enacted statute, governs the
resolution of a dispute. .. .However... statutes
which are procedural only and do not create, alter
or destroy substantive rights may be applied to
courses of action that have accrued or are pending
at the time the statute is enacted.
(Emphasis
added)
The 1987 enactment of Section 63-30-10.5 created a
substantive right which theretofore had not existed where
the flooding damage occurred in 1985 and 1986.
Secondly,

in a proper

case for application of

Section 63-30-10.5, it is clear that the action is meant to
cover

only

"takings11

those

or

"damagings"

pursuant to sovereign power of eminent domain.
does

not

apply

where

property

negligence of governmental

damage

entities.

occurring

The Section

results

from

the

Where there is no

deliberate "taking" or necessary damage of private property
for public use, but only negligence of governmental officers
or employees
function,

engaged

then

no

in the execution of a governmental
constitutional

claim

against

the

governmental entity exists, rather, the claim sounds in tort
and requires a common law action for damages.

In his concurring opinion in Sprinaville Banking
Company v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157, (Utah, 1960), Justice Wade
said at page 166:
Such compensation must result from or grow out of
a public use of property, either the property
taken
or other property used for a public
purpose. . . .Such public use must be (1) the State
is entitled to make, and it must be intentionally
made by the duly constituted public officers and
not be merely the result of negligence or other
wrongful
acts
which
create
ordinary
tort
liability.
(Emphasis added)
In his dissent in Fairclough v Salt Lake County,
354 P.2d 105 (Utah, 1960), Justice Wade said at 110-111:
This provision
(Article I, Section 22, Utah
Constitution)
clearly requires the taking or
damaging of tangible private property and that the
public use must be intentional and not merely
accidental or negligently caused.
So damages for
personal injuries or from breach of contract and
all damages except from an intentional public use
are not included in such consent.
...It is generally recognized that accidental or
negligent injury is not a damage to private
property for public use, so that case has no
bearing on our problem.
POINT III
SECTION 63-30-3 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
EVEN IN VIEW OF ARTICLE I, SECTION
22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
A. Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of
Utah.
The Utah Case Law on this issue is stated in the
opinions
Their

of Utah Supreme Court Justices Henroid and Wade.

concurring

opinions,

dissents

and

rebuttals

are in

Sprinaville Banking Company v. Burton, supra; Fairclough v.
Salt

Lake

Parker,

County,

368

P.2d

supra;
585

and,

(Utah,

State

1962);

Road
firmly

Commission

v.

establish

the

application and meaning of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.

Justice Henroid's view was upheld by the Utah

Supreme Court.
alone.

The

When Justice Wade was in dissent, he was
Court's

position

is

without

qualification,

equivocation or condition, that sovereign immunity protects
governmental

entities

in

the

State

of

Utah

from

suits

brought for the purpose of obtaining compensation, for the
taking or damaging of private property for public use; and
that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is not
self-executing
immunity.

so

as

to

constitute

a

waiver

of

that

Further, the cases have clearly set forth the

rule that consent for the State (governmental entities) to
be sued is a legislative matter and will not be created nor
inferred by the courts.

These holdings are based upon the

precedence of Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626 (Utah, 1913);
Campbell Building Company v. State Road Commission, 70 P.2d
857

(Utah,

1937);

££a£s

vs_.

State

Rpafl CQmmiggiQn

v^

District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 P.2d 502 (Utah,
1937); Binaham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah,
1950); Hiorth v. Whittenbera, 241 P.2d

907

(Utah, 1952).

These holdings continued without any change whatsoever up to
the passage of the Legislature of the Governmental Immunity
Act (63-30-1 et.seq.) Utah Code, 1953; see Hurst v. Highway
Department, 397 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1964); and Sine v. Helland,
418

P.2d

979

Utah,

1966);

therefore,

the

Governmental

Immunity Act (the "Act") "substituted a statutory framework"
for the common

law of sovereign immunity existing prior

thereto in the State, "to be interpreted by the Courts and
re-shaped
time".

by the

Legislature

as necessary

from

time to

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983), 629-

630.
Upon

its

enactment

in

1965

this

statutory

framework for governmental immunity did not provide consent
for the sovereign to be sued for "taking" or "damaging"
private property for public use.

The Act retained sovereign

immunity, except as waived therein.

As a result the Utah

Supreme Court found no basis in the Act to permit a suit,
pursuant to Article I, Section 22.
In Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 522 P.2d
1286 (Utah,

1973), the Court stated:

The law has long been established in this State
that under (the claim of taking a property without
compensation) there can be no recovery from the
State for damages.... Sufficient has been said as
to the pro and con of this subject that we think
it unnecessary and undesirable to extenuate
thereon, but refer to the adjudicated cases.
The Court's reference is to the following cases:
StfrtQ

v^

Fpyirth

Digtrigt

CQUrtr

Supra;

Hjprth

v.*.

Whittenbera, supra; Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra;
Springville

Banking

Company

v.

Burton,

supra;

State

v.

Parker, supra; and Anderson Investment Corp., v. State of
Utah, 503 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1972).
Thus, there is absolutely no basis for third-party
plaintiffs

in this case to seek or obtain recovery from

Bountiful pursuant to Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.
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POINT IV
GRANTING BOUNTIFUL ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY IS NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE UTAH
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
Landforms urges that the Utah Comparative Fault
Act requires the fault of all parties to an occurrence be
compared at trial in order for the fault of the respective
parties

to

be

accurately

apportioned.

They

cite

the

following:
78-27-38 Comparative Negligence
However, no defendant is liable to any other
person seeking recovery for an amount in excess of
the proportion of fault to that defendant,
(Emphasis added)
78-27-40 Amount of Liability Limited to Proportion
of Fault—No Contribution
Subject to Section 78-27-38 the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant.
No
defendant is entitled to contribution from any
other person.
(Emphasis added)
The
inclusion

of

Sections
all

above

parties

comparative fault.

cited

to

make

do
a

not

require

determination

the
of

None of the cases cited by Landforms

stand for the proposition that applying the provisions of
the Utah

Comparative

Fault Act

in effect

constitutes a

waiver of governmental immunity.
Landforms cites a number of cases:

In Wilson v.

Probst, 581 P.2d 380 (Kan.,1978) the State as a Third-Party
plaintiffr was dismissed out of the suit by the lower court.
The court held that the State had to remain as a named
party,

even

though

liability

could

not

be

established

against the State given its immunity•

In Brown v. Keill,

580 P. 2d 867 (Kan., 1978), the court held that the liability
for damages based on the proportionate

fault of all the

parties to the occurrence, could be considered, even though
one or more parties cannot be joined formally as a litigant.
In Pocatello Ind. Park Company v. Steel West Inc. 621 P.2d
399 (Id., 1980), the court held that a jury must have the
opportunity

to

consider

the

negligence

of

all parties,

whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit.

In Bartlett

v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. 646 P.2d 579 (N.Mex.,
1982),

the

court

quoted

with

approval,

Heft

and

Heft

Comparative Negligence Manual (1978, Section 8.131):
It is accepted practice to include all tort
feasors in the apportionment question.
This
includes non-parties who may be unknown tort
fgfrgQrg, phantomflrivgrgfrnflp^rgong alleged to 13&
negligent but not liable in damages to the injured
party, such as in the Third-Party cases arising in
Workmen's Compensation area.
Bountiful contends that the Utah Comparative Fault
Act does not require the inclusion of all parties in order
to determine comparative fault.

Even so, case law suggests

that if all parties to the occurrence must be considered in
determining the comparative fault process, they need not be
parties to the suit.
CONCLUSION
Bountiful submits that the District Court did not
err in granting Bountiful a Summary Judgment upon the basis
that their actions involved the management of flood waters
and other natural disasters, or the construction, repair and

operation of flood storm systems and thus that they were
absolutely immune from suit.
Section

63-30-3

of

the

Act

is

not

unconstitutional in light of Article I, Section 22, of the
Utah Constitution, which is not self-executing and does not
apply to unintentional or negligent takings sounded in tort.
Immunity

is not waived by any of the Sections

granting waivers of immunity and applying and enforcing the
Utah Comparative Fault Act does not require that Bountiful
be included in a party litigant and does not waive immunity.
It is respectfully requested that the judgment of
the trial court be affirmed.
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